Cybersecurity Special Edition: India and Russia Cyber threats against Europe and Ukraine. A comprehensive analysis with Kgb and FSB against Europe and Ukraine from 1950 until 2025

🌊 Mumbai – Genova 🌍 India – Italy Submarine Internet Cables

#RussiaUkraineWar 

Cybersecurity Special Edition 

© Paola Blondet 

India should be excluded by the QUAD cooperation with NATO and allies, here is why: 

"India and Rest of the World" Telegram hackers group in 2020-2021 taught me a lot already about the methods used by India against Europe and against Ukraine. 

I submit to you a comprehensive analysis of the cyber threats still nowadays posed by India against Europe and Ukraine. 

With a detail chronohistorical analysis of the main actions such as clandestine operations of the Russian agencies KGB and FSB inside India and their long-term impacts against the NATO. 

Let's start from the bottom of everything, the most recent news:

This is the reason why India should be expelled by the QUAD cooperation of Australia, Japan and NATO. India should NOT stay there as a partner, because it's a treacherous and malicious tricky one. Not reliable and very dangerous for Europe and also for Ukraine in the first place. 

Confirmed Indian Cyber Threats Against Europe/NATO:

Summary and Key points:

Indian cyber threats against NATO are real and growing, with:

Direct attacks on European ministries (Italy case).

APT groups pivoting from regional to global targets.

Offensive capabilities institutionalized via India’s Defense Cyber Agency.

Risk to NATO’s naval and air defense systems through espionage and ICS compromise.

1. DoNot APT Targeting Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

Actor: DoNot APT (aka APT-C-35, Mint Tempest, Origami Elephant, Viceroy Tiger) – attributed to India.

Incident: July 2025 spear-phishing campaign against Italian diplomatic and defense officials.

Method:

Impersonated European defense attachés in emails.

Malicious Google Drive link → RAR archive → custom malware (notflog.exe) → persistent scheduled tasks.

Goal: Long-term espionage and exfiltration of sensitive defense communications.

Impact: Breach of diplomatic channels linked to NATO coordination.

Expansion of Indian APTs Beyond South Asia

Groups:

SideWinder and Patchwork (Indian-linked) previously focused on Pakistan/China but now show technical overlaps in campaigns against European entities.

Capabilities:

Spear-phishing with defense-themed lures.

Malware families enabling credential theft and lateral movement.

Strategic Objective: Intelligence collection on NATO-aligned states.

Indian Defense Cyber Agency (DCA) Offensive Mandate

India’s tri-service Defense Cyber Agency, operational since 2020, explicitly tasked with:

Hacking networks of strategic importance abroad.

Surveillance and persistent access in adversary systems.

While official doctrine emphasizes regional threats, its capabilities (malware development, encrypted channel exploitation) can be repurposed for European defense targets, especially during the constant geopolitical alignment with Russia, which NEVER ended even now. 

Potential Threat Vectors to NATO Naval & Air Systems:

Naval:

Indian-origin APTs could exploit maritime logistics software or ICS vulnerabilities in European ports (already under heavy attack globally).

NATO CCDCOE warns that state-linked APT tactics are uniform across regions, meaning Indian actors can reuse proven TTPs against vessel traffic systems and port access controls.

Why Does This Matters Now? 

Hybrid Warfare Context: Russia’s war in Ukraine has created an ecosystem where non-Western cyber actors (including Indian APTs) exploit NATO’s stretched defenses.

Attribution Complexity: Indian-origin attacks often masquerade as benign or regional, but recent campaigns show clear pivot to Europe.

Strategic Risk:

Intelligence leaks from NATO partners weaken alliance cohesion.

ICS/SCADA compromise in ports or airbases could disrupt logistics for NATO naval and air missions.

Regions in Europe Targeted:

Italy: Confirmed spear-phishing and malware deployment.

Potential Expansion: NATO summit infrastructure, maritime hubs in Mediterranean, and defense ministries in Southern Europe (based on lure themes and infrastructure overlaps. 

Indian Cyber Threats Targeting NATO/EU Defense Infrastructure:

Overview:

Indian-linked Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups have expanded beyond South Asia, conducting espionage campaigns against European defense and diplomatic entities, including NATO-aligned states. These operations focus on air defense coordination, maritime logistics, and sensitive diplomatic communications.

Timeline of Key Incidents (2016–2025):

2016–2020: Initial Expansion:

Patchwork (APT-C-35) and SideWinder begin targeting foreign ministries and defense contractors outside South Asia.

Techniques: spear-phishing, malware-laced documents, credential theft.

Objective: Strategic intelligence collection.

2020: Formation of India’s Defense Cyber Agency (DCA). 

Mandate includes offensive cyber operations and persistent access in adversary networks.

Capabilities: malware development, encrypted channel exploitation, ICS/SCADA penetration.

2022–2024: Increased Activity:

Indian APTs observed using defense-themed phishing lures aimed at European aerospace and maritime sectors.

Infrastructure overlaps with campaigns against NATO partners.

July 2025: DoNot APT Attack on Italy:

Target: Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NATO member).

Method:

Spear-phishing emails impersonating European defense attachés.

Malicious Google Drive link → RAR archive → custom malware (notflog.exe).

Persistence via scheduled tasks.

Goal: Long-term espionage, exfiltration of sensitive NATO-related diplomatic data.

APT Profiles:

DoNot APT (APT-C-35)

Focus: Espionage on government and defense entities.

Tactics: Spear-phishing, custom malware, persistence mechanisms.

SideWinder:

Known for targeting military and aerospace sectors.

Expanding infrastructure to European targets.

Patchwork:

Uses fake social media profiles and defense-themed lures.

Malware families: BADNEWS, Ragnatela. 

Threat Vectors for NATO Naval & Air Systems

Naval Domain:

Maritime logistics software and port ICS vulnerabilities.

Potential compromise of vessel traffic systems and NATO supply chains.

Air Domain:

Espionage on air defense coordination data.

Credential theft enabling access to secure NATO communications.

Strategic Risks:

Intelligence Leakage: Sensitive NATO diplomatic and defense data exposed.

Operational Disruption: ICS/SCADA compromise in ports or airbases could delay naval deployments and air missions.

Hybrid Warfare Amplification: Indian-origin cyber operations add complexity to Russia’s ongoing campaigns against NATO. 

European Regions Targeted:

Italy: Confirmed spear-phishing and malware deployment.

Potential Expansion: Mediterranean maritime hubs, NATO summit infrastructure, defense ministries in Southern Europe.

India’s Role in Global Internet Infrastructure:

Undersea Cables = 99% of Global Internet Traffic

India is a major hub for subsea cables in the Indo-Pacific, with 14 landing stations across Mumbai, Chennai, Cochin, Tuticorin, Trivandrum. These cables carry traffic between Asia, Europe, and Africa, making India a critical node for global connectivity.

Impact on Russia:

Russia’s isolation due to sanctions and de-peering from Western IXPs forces it to rely more on alternative routes via Asia, including India-linked corridors.

India’s cables indirectly support global routing stability, which Russia benefits from to maintain connectivity for trade, propaganda, and cyber operations. 

Routing & Peering Dynamics During War:

Sanctions & De-Peering:

Since 2022, Western networks have severed peering with Russian IXPs, causing fragmentation. Russia compensates by strengthening ties with Asian partners, including India, through BRICS and SCO frameworks.

Impact:

Indian IXPs and transit providers (Bharti Airtel, Tata Communications, Reliance Jio) handle significant traffic that can indirectly route Russian data.

India's Fake neutrality and Real refusal to join Western sanctions allow Russian enterprises to maintain cloud and telecom links via Indian intermediaries, affecting the Ukrainian and most of the European communications as well. 

Submarine Cable Security & Strategic Leverage

Red Sea Cable Attacks (2024–2025):

Houthi disruptions in the Red Sea impacted SMW4, IMEWE, SEA-ME-WE 6, forcing rerouting through India’s coastal hubs.

Impact on Russia:

Russia monitors these vulnerabilities because Indo-Pacific cables are lifelines for global finance and military communications.

Russian GRU and GUGI units have been linked to sabotage planning globally; India’s cables are now part of NATO and Quad security discussions.

Cyber & Information Warfare:

Russia uses cyber operations and propaganda as a strategic tool in the Ukraine war. India’s infrastructure matters because:

Hosting of global cloud services in India provides indirect resilience for Russian-linked platforms.

India’s stance on internet governance (multi-stakeholder model) gives Moscow diplomatic cover to push for “sovereign internet” norms. These Indian norms are affecting Europe too also through Google and USA cables. 

Meta sold to India in 2022 many infrastructures. 

Regions/States in India Most Critical

Maharashtra (Mumbai): Largest cable landing cluster; Tata Communications hub.

Tamil Nadu (Chennai, Tuticorin): SEA-ME-WE 6 landing; Airtel/Jio nodes.

Kerala (Cochin, Trivandrum): Gateway to Arabian Sea routes.

Delhi: Policy and regulatory center; IXPs for domestic routing.

Indian Hackings of Facebook, affecting the Global cybersecurity and cybersafety domains world widely:

Large-Scale Credential Leaks Affecting Facebook Users:

16 Billion Passwords Leak (2025):

CERT-In (India’s cybersecurity authority) warned that 16 billion login credentials were exposed globally, impacting millions of Indian and Western users on platforms like Facebook, Instagram, Gmail.

Method:

Data came from infostealer malware and misconfigured databases.

Included usernames, passwords, session cookies, and authentication tokens.

Impact:

Enabled credential stuffing, phishing, and account takeovers targeting Indian Facebook users.

Regions affected: Nationwide, especially urban centers with high social media penetration. Usa, Africa and Europe. 

Indian Hacktivist Groups and Facebook

Indian Cyber Force (ICF):

A politically motivated hacktivist group active since 2022, described as pro-India and sometimes state-linked.

Methods:

DDoS attacks, website defacement, and data leaks.

While ICF primarily targets foreign entities (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Canada), its campaigns often involve social media manipulation, including Facebook pages and groups.

Notable:

Meta removed only 50 among 1 million of accounts linked to Patchwork, an Indian APT group, for espionage and influence operations using Facebook and Instagram.

Espionage Groups Using Facebook:

Patchwork (Operation Hangover):

Indian-linked APT group active since 2015, targeting Pakistan and China.

Facebook connection:

Used fake profiles and pages to distribute malware via links and gather intelligence.

Meta confirmed takedown of accounts tied to Patchwork in 2025. 

Massive Facebook Data Breach (ByteBreaker Claim)

More than 1.2 Billion Accounts Breach (2025):

A hacker named ByteBreaker claimed to sell data scraped from Facebook, including names, emails, phone numbers, birthdates, and location data.

Method:

Exploited Facebook’s API and automated scraping tools.

Published a sample of 100,000 records on the dark web.

Meta’s stance:

Says the data likely originates from the 2021 breach, not a new hack.

Risk for World wide users:

High exposure due to large user base; data could enable identity theft and fraud.

Indian involvement is twofold:

Victim side: Indian users heavily impacted by global leaks and scraping attacks.

Actor side: Indian-linked APTs (Patchwork, SideWinder) and hacktivist groups (ICF) use Facebook for espionage, propaganda, and malware delivery. 

Indian Malicious Cyber Activity with European Impact:

Hack-for-Hire Operations:

Indian firms like BellTroX InfoTech Services ran one of the largest “spy-for-hire” campaigns globally, targeting European government officials, investors, and journalists. These attacks used phishing and credential theft to compromise email accounts of high-profile individuals in the UK and EU.

WhiteInt Group:

Investigations by "The Times" revealed an Indian hacker group hired by private Russian in disguise investigators in London to target British companies, politicians, and even Swiss President Ignazio Cassis. 

Some clients allegedly acted on behalf of Russian interests, showing India-based hackers as intermediaries in geopolitical cyber operations. 

State-Aligned APTs:

Groups like Bitter (TA397) and Confucius have targeted diplomatic and defense entities across Europe, using phishing and custom malware (e.g., MuuyDownloader, MiyaRAT). These campaigns align with Indian intelligence interests. 

Deliveroo Platform – Cybersecurity Risks:

Past Incidents:

Deliveroo faced credential stuffing attacks in 2016 and 2019, where stolen passwords from other breaches were used to access accounts and place fraudulent orders. No direct system breach occurred, but weak password hygiene among users amplified risk.

Current Security Posture:

Reports from UpGuard and SecurityScorecard show Deliveroo maintains a relatively strong external security rating (81/100),which is false because still risks persist in domains like phishing, malware exposure, payloads and patching cadence. 

Threat Intelligence Integration:

Deliveroo’s head of threat intelligence advocates for cross-functional risk analysis, linking cyber threats to operational and financial impacts—a model relevant for European firms facing global supply chain and data risks. 

Why Indian Breaches Matter for Europe:

Shared Attack Vectors:

Indian food-tech breaches (e.g., KiranaPro, Sewacity Foods) exposed customer data, payment details, and API vulnerabilities. Attackers often reuse these techniques globally, meaning European platforms like Deliveroo face similar risks from credential reuse and API exploitation.

Supply Chain & Vendor Risks:

European companies outsourcing development or support to Indian firms inherit third-party risk. Weak IAM (Identity Access Management) and poor MFA enforcement in Indian startups amplify exposure.

Hacktivism & Geopolitical Spillover:

Groups like Indian Cyber Force (ICF), though primarily targeting South Asian rivals, have demonstrated capability for DDoS and defacement attacks that could pivot to European entities during geopolitical flashpoint. 

Risk Analysis for Cybersecurity Analysts

Key Threats:

Credential Stuffing & Password Reuse (seen in Deliveroo and Indian platforms)

Insider Threats & Former Employee Access (KiranaPro breach)

Hack-for-Hire Ecosystem (BellTroX, WhiteInt)

State-Aligned Espionage (Bitter, Confucius)

Mitigation Strategies:

Enforce MFA across all accounts

Continuous vendor risk monitoring for offshore partners. 

Deploy behavioral anomaly detection for credential stuffing. 

Integrate threat intelligence with business risk models (as Deliveroo suggests). 

Summary of Indian Regions/States most involved or affected by Russia through KGB then and FSB now:

New Delhi (NCT) — Political core; locus of KGB funding & ministry penetration (1950s–1980s); later, policy/regulatory work on subsea cables (2020s). 

Maharashtra (Mumbai) — Major Soviet/Russian consular presence and press/media hub (Cold War); largest subsea cable landing cluster impacting national connectivity (2000s–2020s).

West Bengal (Kolkata) — Long‑standing consulate; media & political operations; cable landings in eastern routes via national backbones. 

Tamil Nadu (Chennai, Tuticorin) — Consulate hub; SEA‑ME‑WE‑6 and multiple CLS; critical for east‑bound/Red Sea traffic flows. 

Kerala (Cochin, Trivandrum) — CLS nodes feeding Arabian Sea/Red Sea paths; Global Cloud eXchange/Tata sites; outage rerouting impact. 

Goa — Special status in WWII/early Cold War maritime context; later cultural/covert meeting node (no official KGB office disclosed). 

Haryana & Rajasthan — Strategic proximity to Delhi, borders & military corridors; relevant for logistics/monitoring, not known formal KGB bases. 

*****

The BJP IT Cell – Digital Machine:

The BJP IT Cell is essentially a political tech infrastructure: it runs on social media automation, WhatsApp broadcast groups, data analytics, and meme factories.  

Its backbone is built with standard programming languages and cloud services (Python for scraping/analytics, Node.js for bots, PHP/Java for portals, SQL for databases).  

The goal is domestic propaganda and electoral influence, not military‑grade cyber operations.

Russian Presence in India – Tech Angle

Reports of “copious Russian agents in India” usually refer to intelligence and business networks (energy, defense, diaspora).  

Russian cyber doctrine emphasizes information warfare: disinformation, botnets, VoIP spoofing, and influence campaigns.  

 Technologically, Russian actors often use similar toolkits (Python scripts, Telegram bots, VPNs, VoIP channels) but for geopolitical disruption, not party campaigning.

The KGB’s “technologies” in India were soft power tools of espionage and information warfare: encrypted comms, surveillance methods, propaganda placement, and organizational platforms. They seeded practices that later evolved into India’s own digital and intelligence infrastructures.

India became one of the largest theaters of KGB active measures outside the USSR.  

KGB Technologies in India – Historical Context

Cold War backdrop: From the 1950s through the 1980s, the Soviet Union (via the KGB) invested heavily in India as a strategic partner.  

Focus: Not just espionage, but also information control, propaganda, and influence operations.  

Technology transfer: While the KGB didn’t openly “export” hardware like missiles to India (those came through official defense deals), it did introduce methods and tools of covert communication, surveillance, and disinformation.

Possible Overlaps: 

Shared techniques, not shared infrastructure:  

Both BJP IT Cell and Russian cyber networks rely on social media manipulation, bot amplification, and encrypted messaging apps.  

The overlap is in methods (automation, analytics, VPN masking), not in direct collaboration.  

Narrative convergence: Russian disinformation sometimes aligns with nationalist narratives in India, but that doesn’t prove organizational or technological integration.  

Speculative risk: If Russian agents in India were to study or infiltrate BJP IT Cell methods, they could adapt those pipelines for broader information warfare against Europe. But evidence of direct technological cooperation is limited.

The “technology” was less about hardware and more about information warfare infrastructure: propaganda pipelines, encrypted communications, and covert influence networks.  

Many of these methods echo today in digital propaganda cells (like BJP IT Cell) and transnational disinformation campaigns, showing continuity from Cold War analog tools to modern cyber ecosystems.

Key Technological & Methodological Imports

 Secure communications:  

Training the Indian counterparts in cipher machines, one‑time pads, and radio encryption.  

  Techniques for dead drops, invisible inks, and microdots adapted into local intelligence practices.  

Media manipulation:  

 KGB pioneered press placement technologies, covert funding of newspapers, magazines, and journalists, with ready‑made propaganda articles.  

 India became a testing ground for information warfare, where Soviet narratives were seeded into local language media.  

Surveillance know‑how:  

 Techniques for wiretapping, bugging offices, and monitoring diplomatic missions were shared with Indian agencies.  

 Early signal intelligence (SIGINT) methods, including radio interception, were introduced.  

Front organizations & NGOs:  

 KGB used cultural societies, publishing houses, and student unions as technological “platforms” for influence.  

   These were essentially human‑network technologies, designed to amplify Soviet messaging.  

Computing & cyber precursors:  

  By the late 1980s, Soviet advisors exposed Indian institutions to mainframe computing, database management, and cryptographic protocols.  

  These laid groundwork for later Indian cyber capabilities, though not as advanced as Western imports.

1950s: Early KGB penetration of Indian diplomacy & politics

1953–1956 – Diplomatic honey traps in Moscow: Indian diplomats were recruited by the KGB using “swallow” agents; one diplomat codenamed PROKHOR provided embassy codebooks and deciphering tables, receiving monthly payments that rose to ₹4,000. Regions/States affected (Indian side): New Delhi (PMO, MEA); operations occurred in Moscow but targeted Indian diplomatic channels. 

Late 1950s – Political infiltration & funding lines: The KGB built channels to Indian parties, leveraging ideological ties and covert cash transfers; India already emerging as the KGB’s top Third World target. Regions/States: Delhi (national politics); influence radiated nationwide.

1960s: Influence over defense procurements & party financing

1962 & 1967 – Campaign funding & defense bias: The KGB funded V.K. Krishna Menon’s election campaigns and promoted procurement of Soviet MiG aircraft over Western alternatives. Regions/States: Delhi (Defense Ministry); potential impact across Maharashtra (airbases), Uttar Pradesh, Haryana (military establishments near Delhi). 

1959 onwards – Front companies: CPI agreed to set up import–export businesses trading with the Soviet bloc, generating ₹3 million/year by the early 1970s for covert tasks. Regions/States: West Bengal (Kolkata), Maharashtra (Mumbai) — commercial hubs used as nodes for trade-cover operations. 

1970s: Peak KGB “active measures” and media control

1970s – Largest agent network outside USSR: Estimates suggest 50–80 KGB/GRU officers in-country and extensive indigenous networks. Regions/States: Delhi (PMO, ministries), West Bengal (Kolkata), Maharashtra (Mumbai), Tamil Nadu (Chennai) — all with Soviet consular presence. 2

1975 – Massive “active measures” budget: The KGB spent 10.6 million roubles to strengthen Indira Gandhi and undermine opponents. Regions/States: Delhi (political core), ripple effects nationwide.

1973–1975 – Media capture & disinformation: By 1973, the KGB controlled 10 newspapers and a press agency; 1.6 million planted articles overall, incl. 5,510 in 1975 alone, pushing pro‑Soviet narratives and anti‑U.S. disinformation. Regions/States: Delhi, Maharashtra (Mumbai), West Bengal (Kolkata), Tamil Nadu (Chennai) — major press centers. 

1977 – Financing non‑communist politicians: KGB files listed 21 non‑communist politicians (including 4 Union Ministers) whose campaigns were subsidized. Regions/States: Delhi (Union ministries); multiple states depending on constituencies.

1980s: Continued penetration; 

CIA assessments:

1985 – CIA analysis of “major penetration program”: Declassified CIA report concluded the USSR sought to bind India closer via overt/covert influence across virtually every sector. Regions/States: National scope with concentration in Delhi, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu.

Goa, Haryana, Rajasthan: Regional notes (cross‑decade context)

Goa (pre/post‑1961): Goa’s unique status (Portuguese enclave until 1961) created a permissive environment for clandestine maritime/diplomatic contacts; later, it served as a cultural/meeting node rather than a declared KGB “office.” Region/State: Goa. 

Haryana & Rajasthan: No public records of formal KGB “offices”; proximity to Delhi (Haryana) and strategic lines toward Pakistan (Rajasthan) made these states relevant for monitoring, logistics, and front activities, often via Delhi‑based hubs. Regions/States: Haryana, Rajasthan, linked to Delhi networks. 

1990s: Transition from KGB to SVR/GRU; diplomatic covers persist

1991 onwards – Successor services: With the USSR’s dissolution, SVR (foreign intelligence) and GRU (military intelligence) inherited overseas tasks; operations continue via embassies/consulates (New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai) using diplomatic cover. Regions/States: Delhi, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu. 

2000s–2010s: Hybrid tactics and cyber components emerge

2000s–2010s – Evolution toward hybrid/CYBER ops: Russia’s services intensified sabotage, hacking, and disinformation globally; GRU activity targeted infrastructure and Western allies, with tactics later relevant to undersea cable threats. Regions/States (India relevance): While not always India‑specific, Indian connectivity relies on coastal states with cable stations.

2020s: Russian interest in submarine internet cables; India’s cable geography

Global Russian intent & capability against subsea cables: NATO, NSA, CISA, FBI and partners warn that GRU Unit 29155 expanded to sabotage/espionage against critical infrastructure, and reports highlight Russian vessels/submarines surveilling cable routes; the secretive GUGI unit is assessed to menace cables. Regions/States (global context; India impacted via routes): Vulnerabilities along routes carrying India’s traffic. 

India’s coastal landing hubs (critical for resilience & potential targeting):

Mumbai, Maharashtra — multiple cable landing stations (Tata Communications; Reliance Jio; Bharti Airtel; Sify). 

Chennai, Tamil Nadu — major landings (Bharti Airtel; Reliance Jio; new SEA‑ME‑WE 6). 

Cochin (Kochi), Kerala — Tata Communications CLS; gateway to Arabian Sea/Red Sea routes. 

Tuticorin, Tamil Nadu — BSNL landing; link to Sri Lanka and onward systems. 

Trivandrum, Kerala — Global Cloud eXchange station (WARF/other regional cables). 

(TRAI and Ministry sources: tally international subsea cables landing at stations across these cities.)

2024–2025 – Vulnerability spikes via Red Sea outages:

Cable damage/events in the Red Sea disrupted Indian connectivity (AAE‑1, EIG, TGN), forcing Airtel, Jio, Tata to reroute traffic. Regions/States: Impact felt nationwide; routing pressure highest on Mumbai/Chennai gateways. 

India Today reports at least 17 cables surfacing at 14 stations across Mumbai, Chennai, Cochin, Tuticorin, Trivandrum; outages showcased dependence on these hubs. 

Indian operators (e.g., Bharti Airtel) expanding landings and capacity, citing security of subsea infrastructure; SEA‑ME‑WE‑6 landed at Chennai/Mumbai in 2024–2025. Regions/States: Tamil Nadu (Chennai), Maharashtra (Mumbai)

Policy/regulatory attention: TRAI/DoT proposals to reshape landing‑station licensing and treat cables as critical infrastructure. Regions/States: Delhi (policy); coastal states above (implementation). 18

Quad & allied posture: Analyses note Quad (US, Australia, Japan, India) coordination to secure seabed infrastructure amid Russian/Chinese threats. Regions/States: Strategic maritime zones linked to Mumbai/Chennai hubs and Andaman & Nicobar (domestic CANI cable).

© 2025 Paola Blondet – Tutti i diritti riservati.
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