Tunisia, Egypt and the double role of Israel and Iran

Trapped in the Sultan's Palace

 🧐🧿 Why are some Tunisians and Egyptians so closely in friendship with either Iran and Israel? 

What are the takes of Tunisi about the role of Iran in the Muslims Arab World and why are some of them reviving it now? 

A Strange "friendship" Tunisia-Iran and chronostages of the Persian role in the Arab and Islamic world:

The Tunisia-Iran relationship is pragmatic and intermittent: it feeds on diplomatic convergences on regional crises (Gaza), cultural exchanges and discussions on flights/economic commissions, even without a resident embassy and with limited margins for structural cooperation. The definition of "strange friendship" reflects Tunisian neutralism and Iranian attempts to increase soft power and legitimacy in North Africa. At the same time, the historical role of Persia in the Arab/Islamic world passes from conquest and Islamization (seventh century), to the strong Persian imprint in the Abbasid age, up to the forced "Shiization" with the Safavids (sixteenth century), which shapes the current identity and geopolitical arrangements. 

Tunisia-Iran: dynamics and recurring signals:

Tunisian neutrality and open channels: Relations defined as "good" after 1979, without resident embassies, with declarations of "limitless" cooperation and symbolic gestures such as condolences for the attacks in Tehran (2017). The Tunisian posture tends towards balancing and mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Cooperation and image agenda: Discussions on economy, culture, tourism and direct flights presented by Tehran as an expansion of ties; Iranian narratives emphasize shared positions on the Gaza crisis and the "peaceful" profile of the nuclear program for the construction of diplomatic consensus.

Realism of limits: Independent analyses point out that, although the ties appear to be growing, they do not equip either Tunis or Tehran with additional tools to challenge the West; It is a pragmatic rather than strategic rapprochement, sensitive to Tunisian domestic changes and regional constraints.

On the other hand, Tunisia is too much friendly with Israel and it was reported by many sources that the Mossad recruited Tunisian people for their "jobs". 

Chronostages of the Persian role in the Arab and Islamic world:

Muslim conquest of Persia (633–651): Fall of the Sassanids, advance of the Rashidun Caliphate; gradual Islamization with the decline of Zoroastrianism, local resistance and integration into Islamic civilization in subsequent centuries.

Persian imprint in the Abbasid age (VIII–X): Transfer of the capital to Baghdad, Persian elites influence administration, courts and grammarians; intellectual contributions in Arabic and the preservation of the Persian language consolidate a lasting cultural bridge.

Post-medieval age and confessional identities: Sunni prevalence for centuries, then forced conversion to Shi'ism with the Safavids (XVI), codifying the Sunni/Shiite fracture with geopolitical effects up to the contemporary age. 

Modernity and the Iranian State: The persistence of a bilingual intellectual tradition and trans-regional networks makes Iran a vector of narratives, doctrines and mobilizations that cross the Arab world, especially on identity and anti-imperial axes.

Analytical reading: why it is "strange friendship":

Tunisian neutralism vs. Iranian projection: Tunis maximizes flexibility and reputation as a mediator; Tehran seeks recognition and symbolic channels in the Maghreb. The asymmetry of capacity makes the relationship visible but not decisive.

Ideological buffer: The Persian historical significance (Abbasid administration, language/culture) and the confessional dimension (Shi'ism) offer Iran repertoires of influence; in Tunisia these translate into diplomatic and cultural gestures, not into harsh strategic alignments.

Regional sensitivity: Tunisia's posture aims to avoid friction with Arab and Western actors; Iran exploits every narrative opening for soft power and legitimacy, taking into account Tunisian internal constraints and Gulf pressures.

OSINT Report – Iran, Tunisia, Egypt and the role of the Mossad of Israel:

Relations between Iran, Tunisia and Egypt show an intertwining of pragmatic diplomacy, ideological networks and religious instrumentalization. Added to this picture is the dual role of the Mossad: on the one hand, offensive operations against Iran, on the other, narrative influence and deterrence that contribute to polarizing identities and communities. None of the regional actors is innocent: they all use cover-up and propaganda tools for their own objectives.

Iran–Tunisia–Egypt:

Tunisia: ministerial meetings and economic and cultural cooperation projects, accompanied by anti-Israeli rhetoric.

Egypt: cautious rapprochement with Tehran, motivated by security interests (Red Sea, Suez) and international mediation. On the other hand need for cooperation with Israel for oil change and gas plus other commodities. 

Implication: these channels offer Tehran room for influence and cover, without requiring formal alliances.

Communist ecosystems and ideological convergences:

Tudeh (Iran) and CPI (Israel): joint anti-war and anti-imperialist statements, demonstrating ideological bridges across national borders.

Communist International: archives and periodicals documenting positions on imperialism and religion, useful for validating the narrative of convergence.

Limit: ideological convergence does not equate to operational collaboration with state apparatuses.

Instrumentalization of Islam:

Mechanisms: rigidity of identity, sacralization of conflicts, mobilization through mosques and associations, commercial cover.

Events: events synchronized with religious holidays, use of charities and cultural centers as propaganda nodes, moral policing in communities.

Effect: internal division and incitement to violence, functional to political and control objectives.


Mossad – dual role:

Offensive operations: sabotage, targeted assassinations, HUMINT networks and cyber against Iranian infrastructure.

Narrative and deterrence: Spreading operational successes and leaks to influence regional perceptions and push Arab states closer to Israel.

Consequence: fueling cycles of polarization and retaliation, which add to the Iranian dynamics.

Exploitment of Islam by stressing it and purport this as "extremist". 

The nefarious influence of the Mossad in the North Atlantic arenas became crucial for many interpretational mistakes. 

Israel tend to consider "everything about the Muslims" as fundamentalistics, they do not distinguish the secular people from the extremist ones. 

However it is comfortable for either the Israeli Mossad and the MOIS of Iran, not to fight too much between each others, to try to encourage Islamic terrorism as Netanyahu did with Hamas and the MOIS did with Hezbollah. 

Conclusions:

Iran, Tunisia and Egypt maintain pragmatic relations that open up spaces of influence.

Communist networks provide ideological convergences, but they do not prove operational collaboration.

Islam is instrumentalized as a lever of identity and mobilization.

Mossad plays a dual role: direct operations and narrative influence, also contributing to the division.

© Paola Blondet 🧿✍🏻🌺🔵🐧


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