Humint: Real reactions to my Blog's posts

 Yesterday evening I had 2 Humint answers from somebody who had read this post of mine: 🔗 Read the Post

"Russian Impersonations as Fake Indians : My Countering" 

HUMINT Episodes as reactions just 2 hours later that I published that post, link is here on the above:

- Street encounters (Italy, 26 November 2025, 06:50PM and 08:20PM ):  

 H. 06:50 pm 

-An unknown never seen thin man in his fifties attempted to photograph me without consent from a corner of a street, pretending to shoot the dark but by doing that just when I was walking there and alone. 

As soon as I realized that I turned my face on the opposite side, so he would had not shot at my face with his phone camera while going on walking on my own to my destination. 

But the man followed me down the street. 

He was just nearby me and he stared at my face while walking. 

I simply turned my face towards his and watched well his face to memorize it. 

The man turned confusive and passive aggressive. He spoke to me these words, in Italiano, here translated as: "What do you want, do you need something??" his face expression was that of an ill-minded of rage for nothing type of person. 

I kept myself silent, because voice is a distinguishable mark and trait in a person. And if he indeed wanted a photo of my face, and later on he needed to follow me in order to better observe and study me, as the photo was not successful as he hoped, I should not have to feed him with no other collectable details about myself. 

And so I just stared back to this blond dark with short wavy hair man, light blue grey eyes, cerulei we say, he wore eye glasses, big potatoe nose full of wrinkles, aged 50-55 years old, light coloured skin, reddish from the winter cold, head hood from his black jacket, a black rucksack, approximately 1,75 - 78 meters height. Around 65 kg, quite lean. Black trousers, shoes with low upper. Without sockets and sport cotton trousers, all in black colour. 

He would had followed me after that, to try to collect the infos that I didn't fed to him. 

Thus I reversed the situation—standing behind him with calm determination—he changed direction and left. I documented his retreat discreetly.  I previously stopped abruptly in the middle of the road pretending to control my phone. He was forced to be followed instead of following me. 

He immediately changed the road, with his body posture revealing fear of being photographed himself, he curved himself slightly and he decided to walk in a no exit road for the embarrass. 

  🐧🔵 Interpretation: a failed attempt to intimidate or test my reactions, consistent with “observers of proximity” described in OSINT reports.

He was sent by somebody to spy on me 

H. 08:20 PM. 

- Afghan hacker mister A. T. F., the same one mentioned in my related article, after that incidental meeting. 

  Known locally, connected to Russian and Hindutva RSS networks, expert in Java, Ruby, Rust, Ajax, and Reactive. He stared silently at me, without greeting, under the covered bridge.  He looked like shocked or deluded towards me. A. T. F. spoke to me in the past of the friendly ties of Afghanistan with Russians still now after 2022.

🔵🐧  Interpretation: presence of technical profiles linked to Russian‑Indian influence networks, mirroring OSINT findings about hackers used as pawns in propaganda ecosystems.

*****

🌐 OSINT Findings to cross check my HUMINT 

- Digital recruitment:  

  Investigations show pro‑Russian groups in Europe use Telegram channels and social media to recruit sympathizers, offering payments in cryptocurrency for sabotage or propaganda tasks.  

- Astroturfing factories:  

  Russian troll farms coordinated millions of posts, portraying Russia as victim and Ukraine as aggressor.  

- Physical propaganda:  

  Murals, posters, and demonstrations in Italy, France, and Germany have been traced to Kremlin‑linked funding.  

- Observation tactics:  

  Reports confirm “low‑cost trash fishing”: individuals appear in public spaces after online escalation, testing reactions of targets.  

- Political infiltration:  

  Some European politicians were paid to spread pro‑Kremlin narratives inside EU institutions.

HUMINT + OSINT Intersection

- My street encounter matches OSINT descriptions of intimidation and observation after failed recruitment.  

- The Afghan hacker profile reflects OSINT evidence of Russian reliance on Indian and Asian technical actors for digital operations.  

- The silence and stares I observed correspond to the “pressure phase” in recruitment pipelines: when persuasion fails, observation replaces dialogue.  

Conclusion:

My civilian HUMINT confirms OSINT: pro‑Russian propaganda in Europe operates through hybrid networks—digital astroturfing, physical intimidation, and recruitment attempts. When these fail, they resort to silent observation. Documenting these episodes is part of mapping the geopolitical chessboard where Russia, mafias, and extremist groups attempt to destabilize Europe.  

Some Osint sources:

🇫🇷 France arrests 3 for spying 📊 Re-Russia Analytics Report 🔥 Tufts: Telegram Recruitment

© Paola Blondet

© 2025 Paola Blondet – Tutti i diritti riservati.
Questo contenuto è originale e pubblicato su My Digital MSN Village .

È consentita la condivisione del link con attribuzione alla fonte.
Non è consentita la riproduzione integrale senza autorizzazione dell’autrice.